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Abstract
■ Individuals learn by comparing the outcome of chosen and
unchosen actions. A negative counterfactual value signal is
generated when this comparison is unfavorable. This can hap-
pen in private as well as in social settings—where the foregone
outcome results from the choice of another person. We hy-
pothesized that, despite sharing similar features such as
supporting learning, these two counterfactual signals might
implicate distinct brain networks. We conducted a neuro-
psychological study on the role of private and social counter-
factual value signals in risky decision-making. Patients with
lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), lesion
controls, and healthy controls repeatedly chose between
lotteries. In private trials, participants could observe the out-
comes of their choices and the outcomes of the unselected
lotteries. In social trials, participants could also see the other
player’s choices and outcome. At the time of outcome, vmPFC
patients were insensitive to private counterfactual value sig-
nals, whereas their responses to social comparison were
similar to those of control participants. At the time of choice,
intact vmPFC was necessary to integrate counterfactual signals
in decisions, although amelioration was observed during the
course of the task, possibly driven by social trials. We conclude
that if the vmPFC is critical in processing private counter-
factual signals and in integrating those signals in decision-
making, then distinct brain areas might support the processing
of social counterfactual signals. ■
INTRODUCTION
When we choose among alternatives, we may have the
opportunity to compare the consequences of our choices
with the consequences of foregone options or with the
consequences of choices other people have made. In a
private context, the unfavorable comparison between
obtained and foregone outcomes (what might have
been) can generate negative counterfactual value sig-
nals, called regret in economics (Bell, 1982; Loomes &
Sugden, 1982) and psychology (Zeelenberg, van Dijk,
Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000), or fictive errors
(Lohrenz, McCabe, Camerer, & Montague, 2007) in neuro-
science literature. In a social environment, unfavorable
social comparison might generate interpersonal negative
counterfactuals and thus elicit envy (Bault, Coricelli, &
Rustichini, 2008; Orthony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). The
two types of private and social counterfactual value sig-
nals may therefore be useful to improve our decisions.
The involvement of the OFC in processing relative
values and counterfactual signals is well established in
private settings. Evidence from single-cell recordings in
nonhuman primates suggests that the OFC carries infor-
mation related to the relative value of rewarding options
(Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006). OFC neurons respond-
ing to fictive value signals have been found in rats
(Steiner & Redish, 2014) and nonhuman primates (Abe
& Lee, 2011), influencing the animals’ decisions toward
options associated with hypothetical larger rewards in
previous trials (Kim, Huh, Jang, Lee, & Jung, 2015;
Hayden, Pearson, & Platt, 2009). In humans, the OFC en-
codes the difference between obtained and foregone
outcomes (Boorman, Behrens, Woolrich, & Rushworth,
2009; Coricelli et al., 2005), along with other brain areas
such as the striatum and ACC (Lohrenz et al., 2007), and
keeps track of the reward probability of the best un-
chosen option (Boorman, Behrens, & Rushworth, 2011).
Patients with lesions in ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC)—which includes the medial OFC—failed to re-
port regret after comparing the outcome of a bad choice
with a better foregone outcome (Camille et al., 2004), al-
though a recent study attributed this deficit to the lateral
OFC (Levens et al., 2014). Moreover, vmPFC patients are
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impaired in anticipating the negative consequences of
their choices, and they generally do not learn from neg-
ative experience (Wheeler & Fellows, 2008).
By contrast, the implication of the OFC in valuating
one’s own reward relative to rewards obtained by others
is unclear. Intracranial recordings in macaques in a social
setting revealed that only a few neurons of the OFC
respond to another’s reward (Chang, Gariépy, & Platt,
2013). Neurons of ACC, however, encoded either peers’
rewards or both the monkey’s own and its peers’ rewards
(Chang et al., 2013), which is consistent with a role of
these neurons in social comparison. ACC neurons also
predict another agent’s decision to cooperate (Haroush
& Williams, 2015). In an fMRI study with humans
(Bault, Joffily, Rustichini, & Coricelli, 2011), we showed
that the OFC activity was modulated by counterfactual
comparisons, but OFC signals did not distinguish be-
tween situations where the counterfactual outcome was
that of a nonchosen alternative or that of another partic-
ipant. This distinction was, however, observed in the
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC; including parts of the
ACC and the frontal polar cortex). The mPFC signaled
events in which participants won more than their coun-
terparts. Moreover, the mPFC was more activated during
decisions made in a social than in a private context, con-
curring with the proposal that the ventrodorsal organi-
zation of the mPFC represents a distinction between
self- versus other-oriented preferences (Sul et al., 2015;
D’Argembeau et al., 2010; Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji,
2006). Nonetheless, other studies have reported activity
in the OFC related to relative payoff in social comparison
environments (Fliessbach et al., 2007) or to the pre-
diction error of outcomes obtained by others (Burke,
Tobler, Baddeley, & Schultz, 2010). Thus, it is not clear
whether the OFC is critical in encoding social compari-
son signals or whether more dorsal prefrontal areas
might have a more important role.
Patients with lesions in the vmPFC are known to dis-
play abnormal emotional responses to reward and pun-
ishment (Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000; Bechara,
Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1996), as well as reduced
self-conscious emotions such as shame or embarrass-
ment (Beer, Heerey, Keltner, Scabini, & Knight, 2003).
vmPFC patients have also been reported to display in-
appropriate social behavior (Beer et al., 2003; Rolls,
Hornak, Wade, & McGrath, 1994; Stuss & Benson, 1984).
Evidence suggests they lack concern for social and moral
rules and do not experience the aversive emotional
responses to moral violations that are normally found in
nonclinical populations (Gu et al., 2015; Ciaramelli &
di Pellegrino, 2011; Koenigs et al., 2007). These obser-
vations have led to the argument that the impaired
emotional system associated with vmPFC damage con-
tributes to the patients’ inappropriate social behavior
(Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004; Bechara, Damasio, &
Damasio, 2000; Elliott, Dolan, & Frith, 2000). By contrast,
in interactive games, vmPFC patients have been reported
to display normal emotional reactions (Moretti, Dragone,
& di Pellegrino, 2008; Elliott et al., 2000), though their
choice behavior was different from that of healthy par-
ticipants and from patients with lesions in other parts
of the brain. In the ultimatum game (Moretti et al.,
2008; Koenigs & Tranel, 2007), vmPFC patients rejected
unfair offers more often than control participants, al-
though showing normal levels of anger following unfair
offers. Thus, the role of the vmPFC in processing social
emotional responses and the nature of lesion patients’
impairment in social behavior remains an open question.
In particular, it is still unclear whether changes in social
behavior following vmPFC lesions should be attributed to
lesions in the OFC or rather to lesions in adjacent regions
such as the frontal polar cortex and ACC (Rudebeck,
Bannerman, & Rushworth, 2008). We propose to investi-
gate this question by directly comparing decisions in two
environments that differ only in the dimension—social or
nonsocial—of the counterfactual information available.
The aim of our study is twofold. First, we investigate
the role of the OFC in the integration of social informa-
tion in the decision-making process and specifically
whether the OFC is necessary in the processing of social
counterfactual value signals. Second, we seek to confirm
the finding that vmPFC patients are impaired in the pro-
cessing of private counterfactual value signals (Camille
et al., 2004) by testing a different cohort of patients with
brain lesion, as these results have been subject to debate
(Levens et al., 2014). We suggest that the OFC might not
be crucial in maintaining typical behavior in social set-
tings, in contrast to private ones. Thus, patients with
lesions in the vmPFC might still be able to use social in-
formation in their decisions. To test this hypothesis, we
studied emotional and behavioral responses to private
and social counterfactual comparison in patients with
lesions affecting or sparing the prefrontal cortex (PFC)
as well as in a group of healthy controls. Lastly, we inves-




Twenty-five patients with brain lesion and 23 healthy par-
ticipants took part in the study. We recruited 10 patients
with lesions predominantly localized in the ventral part of
the PFC (vmPFC group). The nonfrontal lesion compari-
son group included seven patients with lesions in parts of
the occipital, parietal, or temporal cortex and sparing the
frontal lobe. To perform voxel-based lesion–symptom
mapping (VLSM) analyses, eight additional patients with
prefrontal lesion, outside or not restricted to the vmPFC,
were recruited.
Patients with brain damage were recruited from the
Centre for Studies and Researches in Cognitive Neuro-
science in Cesena (Italy), the Rouen Hospital Charles
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Nicolle (France), and the Lyon Neurological Hospital
(France). Potential participants suffering from visual, motor,
or strong attention deficits that could interfere with their
ability to perform the task were not included in the study.
Twelve patients were taking psychoactive medications,
most commonly anticonvulsants or antidepressants.
Control participants were recruited both in France and
Italy via newspaper advertising. They were screened to
exclude psychoactive medication and conditions of past
or current psychological or neurological illness and
history of head injury.
Patient and control groups differed neither in age
(Table 1; Kruskal–Wallis χ2 = 0.236, p = .97) nor educa-
tion level (χ2 = 5.530, p = .14). When considered sepa-
rately, neither patient group significantly differed from
the healthy control group in age or level of education.
All volunteers gave fully informed consent for the project,
approved by the French National Ethical Committee
(Comité Consultatif de Protection des Personnes dans
la Recherche Biomédicale).
Lesion Analysis
All patients had stable, adult-onset, and well-defined le-
sions. Etiologies and lesion localization of all patients
are described in Tables 2 and 3. Lesion analysis was based
on the most recent clinical MRI (n = 16) or CT (n = 8).
Lesions were manually drawn by an expert (blind to task
performance) onto the normalized T1-weighted tem-
plate MRI scan from the Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) using MRIcron (Rorden, Karnath, & Bonilha,
2007). Three-dimensional representations of lesions were
created by drawing the lesion on the relevant slices of the
template. When a surgical clip was present and artifacts
made it difficult to observe damaged tissue, if damage
was evident above and below the slices containing clip
artifacts, then it was assumed that the lesion also included
the region occupied by the clip. Volumes of lesions were
computed with the VOI description tool of MRIcron. A
prefrontal patient was included in the vmPFC group if
the lesion met the following criteria: (1) more than 50%
of the lesion volume was situated in BA 10 and BA 11
and (2) the lesion’s center of mass was situated in BA 11
or in the ventral part of BA 10. Therefore, patients with a
lesion having a center of mass situated in the PFC who did
not meet the vmPFC inclusion criteria were included only
in the VLSM analyses. These patients had either nonfocal
lesions of the vmPFC (extending to the lateral OFC and to
other parts of PFC) or lesions damaging other parts of
PFC. As they do not constitute a homogenous lesion
group, we expected them to display different patterns of
responses depending on the precise localization and ex-
tent of their lesions. The inclusion criteria for the lesion
control group were a lesion’s center of mass outside the
frontal lobe and an intact prefrontal lobe. The overlap
maps of lesions for the vmPFC and nonfrontal lesion com-
parison patient groups are shown in Figure 1.
Neuropsychological Assessment
A trained neuropsychologist administered a short neuro-
psychological test battery to all participants. The following
tests were used to assess the participants’ executive
functions: the Trail-Making Test (Tombaugh, 2004; see
Giovagnoli et al., 1996, for the Italian version without J
and K), the Modified Card Sorting Test (Nelson, 1976),
and the Frontal Assessment Battery (Dubois, Slachevsky,
Litvan, & Pillon, 2000; for Italian norms, see Appollonio




Lesion patients participated with a confederate of the
same sex. The confederates were members of the
research facility and unknown to the patients. They
were instructed exactly as normal participants to ensure
they would behave as such, but their data were later dis-
regarded because of the possible decision bias induced
by their knowledge of interacting with a patient. Healthy
control participants were paired with another control of
the same sex. One control participant played with a con-
federate because the second participant failed to show
at the experimental session. The two participants of
each pair sat in the same room and were separated by
a panel wall. They were told they were about to play the
same game together but that their payoff would only








vmPFC patients (n = 10) 5/5 1/9 51 (12) 9 (3)
Other PFC patients (n = 8) 1/7 3/5 54 (13) 12 (1)
Control lesion patients (n = 7) 0/7 5/2 52 (12) 12 (4)
Healthy controls (n = 23) 12/11 4/19 52 (8) 11 (2)
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depend on their own choices and not on the other’s
choices.
Task
A lottery task adapted from Bault et al. (2008) was used,
manipulating the magnitude and probabilities of po-
tential gains and losses (see Figure 2). Participants re-
peatedly chose between two lotteries, each with two
possible outcomes from the set of values {−20; −5;
+5; +20}. The probability of obtaining each outcome
was taken from the set {0.2; 0.5; 0.8}. Probabilities were
indicated by a sector on a circle. To make potential gains
and losses easier to differentiate for patients, numbers
and circle sectors were depicted in green for positive out-
comes and in red for negative outcomes. The expected
values of the two lotteries were always of the same sign
(i.e., both positive or both negative). We ensured that the
Table 2. Description of Patients’ Lesions
Patient Etiology Lesion Localization Lesion Volume (cm3)
vmPFC Patients
1 Meningioma vmPFC, bilateral 31.38
2 Penetrating ballistic brain injury vmPFC, bilateral 19.73
3 Cranial trauma Right vmPFC 10.80
4 Angioma Right vmPFC 7.12
5 Meningioma vmPFC, bilateral 15.36
6 AcoA aneurysm vmPFC, bilateral 41.69
7 AcoA aneurysm vmPFC, bilateral 52.67
8 AcoA aneurysm vmPFC, bilateral 56.93
9 Cranial trauma Left vmPFC, dlPFC 27.55
10 ACoA aneurysm Anterior OFC, ACC, frontopolar 52.34
Other PFC Patients
11 Meningioma Left vmPFC, temporal lobe 57.63
12 AcoA aneurysm Left vmPFC, left frontopolar, dlPFC 95.69
13 Aneurysm (right anterior
cerebral artery, A1–A2 tract)
ACC, subgenual area 5.55
14 AcoA aneurysm ACC 25.91
15 Ischemic stroke Left insula, dlPFC 27.15
16 Ischemic stroke Post. OFC, right dlPFC, temporal poles 3.69
17 Meningioma Right lateral OFC, ACC, frontopolar 158.81
18 Ischemic stroke Left insula, lateral PFC 35.93
Control Lesion Patients
19 Glioblastoma Right temporoparietal area 127.83
20 Ischemic stroke Right occipital cortex 145.30
21 Venous stroke Left middle temporal cortex 56.14
22 Left ischemic stroke Left insula, putamen Rolandic operculum 25.63
23 Aneurysm (left medial cerebral artery) Left middle temporal cortex, insula 56.61
24 Spontaneous hemorrhage Left occipital cortex 7.25
25 Meningioma (postoperation) Right occipital cortex 13.35
AcoA = anterior communicating artery; dlPFC = dorsolateral PFC.
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difference in expected values of the two lotteries of all
pairs did not exceed A7 (see Bault et al., 2008, for a
complete list of the lotteries pairs).
Conditions
In total, participants underwent 120 trials of the experi-
mental task. The initial 80 trials had complete feedback,
that is, the outcome of both lotteries was revealed, and
could be either private (40 trials) or social (40 trials), in
randomized order (see Figure 2). The following 40 trials
had partial feedback, that is, only the outcome of the
chosen lottery was revealed.
Private versus social trials (complete feedback) At the
beginning of the trial, two lotteries were displayed, sur-
rounded by a green-dotted square for private trials and
a yellow-dotted square representing the second player
in social trials. Participants could choose one of the two
lotteries at any time by pressing the left or right arrow on
the keyboard. In social trials, after making their choice,
participants could also see the choice made by the sec-
ond player. After a spinning period, the outcomes of both
lotteries were displayed simultaneously. In private trials,
participants could then compare their outcome to that of
the unchosen lottery (counterfactual comparison). In so-
cial trials, they could compare their outcome to that of
the second player (social comparison); they were told
the lotteries were drawn once for the two computers,
that the two players would see the same outcome screen,
and that if both players had chosen the same lottery, they
would receive the same payoff. Finally, in both private
and social trials, participants were asked to provide a sub-
jective emotional rating on the outcome of their choice
(“How do you feel about the outcome of your choice?”),
on a scale ranging from −50 (extremely negative)
through 0 (neither positive nor negative) up to +50 (ex-
tremely positive).
Partial versus complete feedback We introduced par-
tial feedback trials to ensure that the dissociation (ampli-
fication effect) between disappointment and regret,
previously observed in healthy participants but not in
vmPFC patients (Camille et al., 2004), was present with
our participants. As it served replication purposes only,
the partial feedback condition was always presented after
the complete feedback condition. In this way, we avoided
potential spillovers of the partial feedback condition on
our conditions of interest (i.e., private vs. social with
complete feedback). In partial feedback trials, the
Table 3. Number of Voxels Lesioned in Each Brodmann’s Area, Proportion of the Area with Lesions, and Maximum Overlap of
Lesions, for the PFC Patients
BA













10 29138 0.783 7 33861 0.909 4
11 50610 0.767 7 32941 0.499 3
24 2206 0.21 4 4550 0.433 2
25 702 0.051 4 3807 0.278 2
32 11548 0.36 4 23340 0.728 2
38 251 0.009 2 5935 0.219 3
46 3778 0.132 3 24988 0.876 4
47 8096 0.235 4 22996 0.667 3
48 487 0.003 2 26805 0.169 2
4 – – – 638 0.019 1
6 – – – 11112 0.113 2
8 – – – 14383 0.568 2
9 – – – 29819 0.823 2
43 – – – 96 0.014 1
44 – – – 12305 0.653 2
45 – – – 24119 0.846 3
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Table 4. Results of the Neuropsychological Tests for the Two Groups of Participants
Group TMT B-A (sec) MCST Cat. MCST PE FAB Score
vmPFC patients 96 (28)** 4 (2)** 9 (8)** 14 (3)***
Other PFC patients 87 (40)** 3 (2)** 10 (8)** 16 (3)
Control lesion patients 103 (49)** 4 (2)* 7 (7) 16 (2)
Healthy controls 37.96 (24.53) 6.04 (0.56) 1.78 (1.97) 17.35 (0.83)
The line labeled TMT B-A reports the average completion time for the Part B minus Part A of the Trail-Making Task. MCST Cat. is the average
number of categories completed in the Modified Card Sorting Task, MCST PE is the average number of perseverative errors in the Modified
Card Sorting Task, and FAB Score is the Frontal Assessment Battery average score. Numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations. *p <
.05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 based on a Dunn’s test comparing each patient group and the healthy control group, with a Benjamini–Hochberg
adjustment for multiple comparisons.
Figure 1. Overlap map of
lesions of patients. (A) The
overlap of lesions of the 10
vmPFC group are projected on
seven axial slices of the ch2
template from the MRIcron
software. (B) Overlap for the
lesion control group. The scale
represents the number of
patients with overlapping
lesions. The slices are oriented
according to the neurological
convention (i.e., left is left). The
positions of the axial slices are
displayed on the right bottom
sagittal slice.
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spinning and outcome revelation occurred for the cho-
sen lottery only, whereas neither the outcome of the
unchosen lottery nor the choice nor the outcome of the
second participant was revealed.
Counterpart’s Behavior
During training, participants saw their counterpart’s real
choices. During the rest of the session, however, the
counterpart’s choices were computer simulated. This
procedure allowed us, first, to analyze the participant’s
behavior independently from the counterpart’s and, sec-
ond, to control for the environment created by the other
player’s choice behavior and outcomes. The computer
simulated a risk-averse decision maker, as this choice pat-
tern has been proved to elicit competitive behavior, re-
sulting in participants choosing differently than the
computer more often than if it was maximizing expected
values (Bault et al., 2008, 2011). The computer selected
the lottery with the lowest standard deviation (as defined
in Bault et al., 2011, equation S4) in 90% of the trials.
During debriefing, at the end of the experiment, no par-
ticipant reported any doubt about seeing the actual
choice and outcome of the other participant.
Payment
To discourage participants to mentally sum their earnings
and to enable them to treat trials independently, they
were told that the outcome from 20 randomly drawn
trials would be cumulated and that, at the end of the
experiment, they would receive this amount plus a A5
show-up fee. However, to comply with the ethical com-
mittee policy, all participants were offered A20, irre-
spective of their gains in the game. When the hospital
policy did not allow patients to receive monetary com-




After the counterpart’s choice and the outcome of the
lotteries were revealed to the participants, several events
were possible. Trials were categorized as follows accord-
ing to the condition: private partial feedback (PP), private
complete feedback (PC), social same choice (SSC; when
the participant and the counterpart chose the same lot-
tery), and social different choice (SDC; when they chose
different lotteries). Social trials always received complete
Figure 2. Experimental task.
In the private condition, the
participant chose one lottery and
then saw an arrow spinning in
both lotteries. The participant
saw the outcome of both
lotteries (complete condition).
In the example presented here,
they won A5, but they could
have won A20 had she chosen
the other lottery. In the social
condition, a yellow dotted line
representing the other
participant was displayed in
addition to the blue dotted line,
so that the participant knew
she would see the other’s
choice. The choice of the other
was displayed only after the
participant had indicated her
own choice. Participants knew
that the lotteries were drawn
only once; therefore, the
same lottery outcomes were
displayed on both players’
screen.
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feedback, even when both players selected the same lot-
tery. Trials were also categorized as relative gain (+) or
relative loss (−) trials, depending on the sign of the dif-
ference between the outcomes of the chosen and un-
chosen lottery. In partial feedback trials, we considered
the difference between the obtained and nonrealized
outcomes of the chosen lottery.
Nonparametric tests were applied, because several
parametric assumptions (particularly normal distribution
of errors) were violated. The significance of the differ-
ence between behavioral variables, RT, and subjective rat-
ings was estimated with the Wilcoxon signed-rank test
(WSRT) using Stata (StataCorp LLC, College Station,
TX). One-tailed tests were used when we had strong hy-
pothesis on the directionality of the effect {|PP|, |SSC|}
< |PC| < |SDC| (Bault et al., 2008, 2011). Between-
group differences were tested with Kruskal–Wallis tests.
Post hoc planned comparisons between groups were
made with a Dunn’s test, with a Benjamini–Hochberg ad-
justment for multiple comparisons.
One vmPFC patient was excluded from the subjective
rating analysis because he failed to report them, answer-
ing 0 (the default value) in 52.5% in the trials, within
0.78 sec on average (1.59 sec for all trials as opposed
to an average of 7.66 sec for the other patients).
Choice Behavior Analysis
We analyzed how the expected value of lotteries antici-
pated disappointment and regret influenced choices in
all conditions. The variables difference in expected value
(dEV), regret (r), and disappointment (d ) are defined
following Camille et al. (2004):
dEV ¼ EV1− EV2 ¼ px1 þ 1−pð Þy1½ − qx2 þ 1− qð Þy2½ 
d ¼ j y2− x2j 1− qð Þ½ − j y1− x1j 1− pð Þ½ 
r ¼ j y2− x1j− j y1− x2j
where x1, y1 and x2, y2 are the two possible outcomes of
the first and the second lotteries, respectively, with x1 >
y1 and x2 > y2. The probability of x1 is p, and the prob-
ability of y1 is (1 − p). The probability of x2 is q, and the
probability of y2 is (1 − q).
We estimated the probability of the participant choosing
lottery 1 as a function of the difference in expected value
(dEV), anticipated regret (r), and disappointment (d).
Pr c ¼ 1j cð Þ ¼ 1
1þ e∝þβ:dEVþγ:rþδ:d
A positive (negative) and significant expected value
(dEV) coefficient indicates that subjects were more likely
to choose the lottery with highest (lowest) expected
value. Anticipated disappointment (d) is related to the
perspective of getting the lowest outcome of the chosen
lottery in comparison with the highest outcome of the
same lottery. This distance in absolute value is weighted
by the probability of the lowest outcome, assuming that
participants attempt to avoid highly probable losses.
Anticipated disappointment depends on the range of
the lotteries’ possible outcomes, which is similar to a
measure of risk propensity. Anticipated regret is based
on the consideration of a possible choice alongside the
rejection of its alternatives. The process of minimizing
the anticipated regret (denoted as r) consists of rejecting
the lottery associated with highest regret propensity,
when comparing the lowest outcome of this lottery and
the highest outcome of the alternative lottery. In social
trials, anticipated regret can be considered as anticipated
envy, as previous research has shown that participants’
behavior is driven by social comparison (Bault et al.,
2008). Positive coefficients for r and d indicate that par-
ticipants consistently anticipated (minimized) regret and
disappointment, respectively.
Choice behavior was analyzed with multilevel mixed
logit regressions with participants nested in groups,
which allows us to estimate both random and conditional
fixed effects. Parameters were estimated by maximum
likelihood. All regressions were run using the statistical
software package Stata (StataCorp).
For the VLSM analyses, the same regressions (model-
ing choice as a function of dEV, d, and r) were run at
the individual level in private complete and social trial
separately. The r coefficients were then used as behav-
ioral predictor in the VLSM analysis. For one patient
(Patient 11 in Table 2), the estimation failed because of
multicollinearity. The model was reestimated excluding
anticipated disappointment (d) from the regression for
this patient. The r coefficient was used for VLSM analyses
(see below) as for the other participants.
Voxel-based Lesion–Symptom Mapping
VLSM analyses (Bates et al., 2003) were performed using
the Brunner–Munzel rank-order test implemented in
Niistat (https://www.nitrc.org/projects/niistat/). This anal-
ysis compares coefficients of patients having versus not
having a lesion in a given voxel. The eight patients with
lesions of PFC nonrestricted to the vmPFC were included
in this analysis, in addition to the vmPFC and lesion con-
trol patients. Only voxels that were lesioned in at least
three patients were considered.
Statistics were computed using the general linear
model. The threshold of resulting statistical maps were
subsequently set at p < .05 using permutation-derived
correction (Z = 2.82 for the subjective ratings analysis).
Power analysis revealed sufficient power in the vmPFC,
dorsomedial PFC (dmPFC), and left lateral OFC. Power
was not sufficient in the right lateral OFC.
In our first analysis, we used the difference in subjec-
tive ratings between the PP− and PC− events as behav-
ioral measure. This measure controls for interindividual
variability in the use of the rating scale. For the choice
analysis, we used the coefficients for anticipated regret
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Effect of Counterfactual Comparison: Partial Feedback
versus Complete Feedback in Private Trials
We first replicated the results of Camille et al. (2004)
concerning the role of the vmPFC in regret (or private
counterfactual) processing. In the partial feedback condi-
tion, disappointment (PP− events) is characterized by the
unfavorable comparison between the obtained outcome
and the unobtained outcome from the chosen lottery. In
complete feedback condition, regret (PC− events) is
operationalized as the unfavorable comparison between
the outcome of the chosen lottery and the foregone
outcome of the unchosen lottery (upward counterfac-
tual). For a given obtained outcome, we expected a
stronger effect of regret compared with disappointment
(i.e., amplification effect).
In the healthy control group, emotional reactions to
relative losses were stronger in the complete feedback
condition than in the partial feedback condition (WSRT
PC− < PP−, Z = 1.93, p = .03; Figure 3A). The lesion
Figure 3. Subjective ratings in private events and social events. (A) Mean subjective ratings given by the vmPFC patients, lesion control patients,
and healthy control participants in the partial and complete feedback conditions for negative events. The control group gave lower subjective ratings in PC
trials than in partial feedback trials, whereas the vmPFC patients did not. PP = private condition/partial feedback; PC = private condition/complete
feedback. − signs stand for relative losses. (B) Mean subjective ratings for the vmPFC patients, lesion control patients, and healthy control
participants in the social condition (complete feedback). Negative (positive) events include all trials in which the obtained outcome was lower
(higher) than the foregone outcome. The vmPFC patient group did not differ from any of the control groups for all four events. SSC = social
condition/same choice made by both players; SDC = social condition/different choice. + and − signs stand for relative gain and losses, respectively.
(C) Mean subjective ratings distance between the negative PC and PP trials for the three groups. (D) Mean subjective ratings distance between the
SDC− and PC− events for the three groups. Circles represent individual data points. Error bars represent SEM.
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control group showed the same effect (WSRT PC− < PP−,
Z = 1.94, p = .03), whereas the vmPFC patients did not
(WSRT PC− < PP−, Z = −1.42, p = .92). However, there
was no significant effect of group for subjective ratings of
PC− events (Kruskal–Wallis, χ2 = 1.775, p = .4118).
To control for the frequencies of specific pairs of
obtained/unobtained outcomes that could differ between
groups (due to behavioral differences), we restricted the
analysis to trials in which, for a given obtained outcome
of −5 or +5, subjective ratings could potentially be mod-
ulated by higher (+20) or lower (−20) unobtained out-
comes (Figure 4). The subjective ratings reported by the
vmPFC patients were not modulated at all by the feed-
back on the outcome of the unchosen gamble. vmPFC
patients still evaluated a gain (loss) of A5 positively (neg-
atively) even when they could have won (loss) more
choosing the alternative option. The three groups differed
in the subjective rating of PC− events in the restricted data
set (Kruskal–Wallis, χ2 = 7.672, p = .0216). Pairwise com-
parisons revealed that healthy control participants re-
ported stronger negative ratings when obtaining 5 or −5
in the view of a missed opportunity to get A20 than
vmPFC patients (Dunn’s test, Z = 2.603, p = .014). The
lesion control and healthy control groups did not differ
significantly (Dunn’s test, Z = 1.522, p = .096).
Note that, similar to the results previously reported
(Camille et al., 2004), the impairment in vmPFC patients
was restricted to the negative domain. The subjective rat-
ings for PC+ events did not differ in the three groups
(Kruskal–Wallis, χ2 = 4.309, p = .116). These effects
were confirmed by a mixed linear regression that used
the four lottery values as predictors of subjective ratings
(Table 5). Although subjective ratings of healthy controls
were decreased by the outcome of the unchosen lottery
in PC trials, the ratings of vmPFC patients were unaf-
fected and the group interaction was significant. The
lesion control group also differed from healthy controls
for both the obtained outcome and outcome of the un-
chosen lottery, suggesting that the difference was not
specific to regret. Indeed, the group interaction dis-
appeared when we restricted the analysis to regret events
(Outcome chosen < Outcome unchosen,Outcome uncho-
sen × Group, β = −0.318, p = .096), whereas it remained
significant for vmPFC patients (Outcome unchosen ×
Group, β = −0.431, p = .007).
Finally, we controlled for a potential effect of medica-
tion on regret impairment. Patients under psychoactive
medication did not differ from medication-free patients
in their ratings in PP− and PC− events (Mann–Whitney,
PP−: Z = 0.30, p = .76; PC−: Z = 0.91, p = .36).
Figure 4. Effect of unobtained
outcomes on mean subjective
ratings given by the vmPFC
patients and healthy control
participants in the partial and
complete feedback conditions.
Mean subjective ratings
reported by control participants
and vmPFC patients for two
obtained outcomes (−5 or 5) as
a function of the unobtained
outcome (blue line, −20; green
line, +20) in the two private
conditions. In the partial
condition, the unobtained
outcome corresponds to the
unobtained value of the chosen
gamble. In the complete
condition, it corresponds to the
outcome of the nonchosen
gamble. Error bars represent
SEM.
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Therefore, we exclude that psychoactive drugs can ac-
count for the observed impairment in vmPFC patients.
In summary, unlike healthy controls and lesion control
patients, vmPFC patients did not take into account the
outcome of the unchosen option when evaluating the
outcome of their choice.
Involvement of Different Regions of the PFC in
Regret Impairment
We ran a VLSM analysis to better characterize which re-
gion of the PFC is critical to report stronger subjective
feelings caused by counterfactual thinking after a bad
decision. The analysis was run on all patients, including
the eight PFC patients with lesions that were not re-
stricted to the vmPFC.
We used the regret amplification variable (difference
in subjective ratings between the PP− and PC− events)
as behavioral measure in the analysis. No voxel was
associated with reduced regret after correction for mul-
tiple comparisons. Uncorrected analysis revealed that
damage in the medial OFC was associated with impair-
ment in reporting regret (MNI coordinates −3, 53, −5;
Z = 2.54).
Effect of Social Comparison: Private versus Social Trials
Social comparison modulated how participants rated the
outcome of their choices (Figure 3B). Healthy control
participants reported more negative ratings when they
lost in the presence of the other player’s gain than when
they lost in isolation (SDC− < PC−: WSRT Z = 3.76, p <
.001) or when they lost the same amount as the other
participant (SDC− < SSC−, WSRT Z = 3.90, p < .001).
They also reported more positive ratings when they won
more than their counterpart, compared with winning in
isolation (SDC+ > PC+: WSRT Z = 4.15, p < .001) or
winning the same amount (SDC+ > SSC+: WSRT Z =
4.18, p < .001). Thus, healthy control participants were
sensitive to social comparison signals, deriving strong
pleasure from outperforming their counterparts and
strong displeasure from being outperformed.
Patients with vmPFC lesion displayed the exact same pat-
tern of responses in the social settings. As for the healthy
Table 5. Effect of Counterfactual Comparison on Subjective Ratings in the Private Condition
Healthy Controls vmPFC Patients Lesion Controls
Subjective Ratings Coeff SE z Coeff SE z Coeff SE z
Outcome chosen 1.370 0.050 27.46*** 1.355 0.072 18.85*** 1.666 0.086 19.32***
Nonrealized chosen −0.155 0.048 −3.25*** −0.046 0.073 −0.63 −0.137 0.090 −1.52
Outcome unchosen −0.400 0.045 −8.81*** −0.079 0.069 −1.14 −0.107 0.088 −1.21
Nonrealized unchosen 0.085 0.049 1.75 0.008 0.070 0.11 0.076 .089 0.85
Group −0.533 2.061 −0.26 0.742 2.400 0.31
× Outcome chosen 0.015 0.086 0.18 0.296 0.100 −2.97**
× Nonrealized chosen −0.109 0.086 −1.27 −0.019 0.102 −0.18
× Outcome unchosen −0.320 0.082 −3.92*** −0.292 0.100 −2.93**
× Nonrealized unchosen 0.078 0.084 0.93 0.010 0.102 0.10
Constant 2.455 1.125 2.18* 3.028 0.993 3.05** 1.713 2.103 0.81
PC trials
Wald χ2 = 2274.13*** Wald χ2 = 3396.23*** Wald χ2 = 3031.32***
Mixed linear regression modeling the effect of the outcome of the chosen and unchosen lotteries and the nonrealized values of the two lotteries on
subjective ratings, in PC trials, for the healthy control and vmPFC patients and lesion control patients. Group interactions are modeled with a dummy
variable equal to 0 for healthy controls and 1 for vmPFC or lesion control patients. Effects of particular interest are in bold. For healthy controls,
subjective ratings increased with the outcome of the chosen lottery and decreased with the unobtained value of the chosen lottery and the outcome
of the nonchosen lottery. Subjective ratings were only influenced by the obtained outcome in vmPFC patients. The only significant group interaction
was for the outcome of the nonchosen lottery, suggesting that it modulated subjective ratings significantly less for vmPFC patients than healthy
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control participants, SDC− events were rated more nega-
tively than PC− events (WSRT, Z = 2.75, p = .003) or
SSC− events (WSRT, Z = 2.75, p = .003). SDC+ events
elicited more positive emotions than PC+ (WSRT, Z =
2.75, p = .003) and SSC+ (WSRT, Z = 2.65 p = .004).
The lesion control patient group was sensitive to neg-
ative social comparison signals as well (WSRT, SDC− vs.
PC−: Z = 2.28, p = .01; SDC− vs. SSC−: Z = 2.28, p =
.01) and to some extent to positive social comparison
signals (WSRT, SDC+ vs. PC+: Z = 1.44, p = .07; SDC+
vs. SSC+: Z = 1.94, p = .03).
The three groups gave similar ratings for all social events
(Kruskal–Wallis, SSC−: χ2 = .502, p = .778; SDC−: χ2 =
0.038, p = .981; SSC+: χ2 = 0.556, p = .757; and SDC+:
χ2 = 0.977, p =.614). In summary, we did not find any
difference in the counterfactual evaluation of the out-
comes in social settings between vmPFC patients, lesion
control patients, and healthy control participants.
These effects were confirmed by a mixed linear regres-
sion that used the four lottery values as predictors of sub-
jective ratings in social trials (Table 6). Subjective ratings
were influenced by the outcomes of both the chosen and
unchosen lotteries in all three groups. The influence of
the outcome of the unchosen lottery was not significant-
ly different between the two lesion groups and the
healthy control group. Finally, the effect of the outcome
of the unchosen lottery on subjective ratings was signif-
icantly higher in the social than in the private condition
(interaction: Private × Outcome unchosen) for the
vmPFC patient group.
Emotional Amplification Effects in Private and
Social Trials
The signature of regret is the emotional amplification ob-
served in PC− trials compared with PP− trials (Figure 3C).
Table 6. Effect of Counterfactual Comparison on Subjective Ratings in the Social Condition
Subjective Ratings
Healthy Controls vmPFC Patients Lesion Controls
Coeff SE z Coeff SE z Coeff SE z
Outcome chosen 1.427 0.091 15.69*** 1.374 0.060 22.99*** 1.586 0.073 21.68***
Nonrealized chosen 0.115 0.121 0.95 −0.097 0.07 −1.44 −0.0378 0.085 −0.45
Outcome unchosen −0.694 0.109 −6.36*** −0.322 0.105 −3.08** −0.272 0.135 −2.01*
Nonrealized unchosen 0.250 0.075 3.34*** 0.037 0.058 0.65 0.076 .089 0.85
Private 4.217 1.338 3.15** 0.707 1.753 0.40
× Outcome unchosen 0.290 0.110 2.63** 0.101 0.141 0.71
Group 3.174 2.290 1.39 1.171 2.796 0.42
× Outcome chosen −0.011 0.072 −0.16 −0.224 0.085 −2.62**
× Nonrealized chosen −0.036 0.079 −0.45 −0.095 0.096 −0.99
× Outcome unchosen −0.183 0.126 −1.45 −0.233 0.156 −1.50
× Nonrealized unchosen 0.097 0.069 1.39 0.010 0.102 0.10
× Private −3.807 1.603 −2.37* −0.298 2.00 −0.15
× Outcome unchosen × Private −0.184 0.133 −1.38 0.006 0.163 0.04
Constant 1.920 1.217 1.58 −1.200 1.908 −0.63 0.805 2.449 0.33
SDC trials PC and SDC trials PC and SDC trials
Wald χ2 = 1491.50*** Wald χ2 = 5835.26*** Wald χ2 = 4741.12***
Mixed linear regression modeling the effect of social comparison on subjective ratings in healthy controls, vmPFC patients, and lesion controls. Interactions
with group in SDC trials are modeled with a dummy variable equal to 0 for healthy controls and 1 for patients. Interactions with conditions are modeled
with a dummy variable equal to 1 for private trials and 0 for SDC trials. Effects of particular interest are in bold. For all groups, subjective ratings
increased with the outcome of the chosen lottery and decreased with the outcome of the unchosen lottery. Subjective ratings were influenced by the
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Similarly, the signature of envy is the emotional amplifi-
cation observed in SDC− trials compared with PC− trials
(Figure 3D).
The difference in subjective ratings between PC− and
PP− (Kruskal–Wallis χ2 = 5.391, p = .067) was smaller
for vmPFC patients than for the healthy controls (all tri-
als, Dunn’s test, Z = 1.90, p = .043) and the lesion con-
trol patients (Dunn’s test, Z = 2.14, p = .048), whereas
the healthy and lesion control groups did not differ
(Dunn’s test, Z = 0.78, p = .21). The amplification effect
between PC− and SDC− events was comparable for the
three groups (Kruskal–Wallis, χ2 = 4.949, p =.084), so
was the amplification effect between PC+ and SDC+
events (χ2 = 0.323, p = .851).
vmPFC patients experienced a higher emotional amplifi-
cation elicited by social comparison relative to private
counterfactual comparison (PC−–SDC− > PP−–PC−,
WSRT, Z = 2.70, p = .007). This was not the case for
the healthy (WSRT, Z = 1.49, p = .136) and lesion
(WSRT, Z = 1.69, p = .091) control groups. The differ-
ence in amplification effect was significantly affected by
the group variable (Kruskal–Wallis, χ2 = 7.781, p =
.020). The vmPFC group differed from both the healthy
(Dunn’s test, Z = 2.74, p = .009) and lesion controls
(Dunn’s test, Z= 1.90, p= .043). The two control groups
did not significantly differ (Dunn’s test, Z = 0.23, p =
.408).
Choice Behavior
We tested a model of choice incorporating the difference
in expected values between the two gambles, anticipated
disappointment and regret, as choice predictors in pri-
vate and social trials. Anticipated regrets in private and
social trials are both defined on the same counterfactual
comparison between expected outcomes of chosen and
unchosen options; the only difference between the two
situations is the players’ knowledge that the outcome of
the alternative lottery could be obtained by the other
participant.
Mixed logistic regressions showed that, in addition to
maximizing expected values, healthy control participants
significantly maximized expected values (βEV = 0.131,
p < .001) and minimized future regret (βr = 0.042, p <
.001) in complete feedback trials (Table 7).
vmPFC patients chose the lottery with highest ex-
pected value (βEV = 0.070, p= .004). Although they max-
imized expected values less than healthy controls
(βEV×Group = 0.061, p = .033); it was the strongest pre-
dictor of their choice. This suggests that they understood
the game and were as motivated to earn money. They
took into account potential future regret as well (βr =
0.015, p = .02). However, they did so significantly less
than healthy controls (βr×Group = 0.027, p = .001). We
tested the hypothesis that vmPFC anticipated regret
Table 7. Choice Behavior in the Complete Feedback Condition
Healthy Controls vmPFC Patients Lesion Controls
Choice Coeff SE z Coeff SE z Coeff SE z
dEV 0.131 0.015 8.44*** 0.067 0.024 2.89** 0.009 0.028 0.33
d 0.006 0.007 0.96 −0.037 0.010 −3.55*** 0.049 0.032 0.42
r 0.042 0.004 9.30*** 0.015 0.006 2.38* 0.039 0.014 4.89***
Group −0.032 0.089 0.36 0.251 0.123 2.04*
× dEV 0.061 0.029 2.13* 0.123 0.032 3.86*
× d 0.044 0.012 3.52*** 0.001 0.014 0.11
× r 0.027 0.008 3.44*** 0.003 0.009 0.39
× Constant 0.041 0.049 0.83 0.077 0.107 0.72 −0.210 0.107 −1.95
LL = −1180.89
Wald χ2 = 165.71***
LL = −1684.54
Wald χ2 = 206.39***
LL = −1545.69
Wald χ2 = 205.74***
Complete Trials, N = 80
Mixed logistic regression modeling the effect, on choice behavior, of the difference in expected value (dEV), anticipated disappointment (d ), an-
ticipated regret (r) between the lotteries, in complete feedback trials. Effects of particular interest are in bold. The group variable is equal to 1 for
controls and 0 for patients. The interactions between dEV, d, r, and group are also included. vmPFC patients anticipated regret significantly less than
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more in social than private trials; however, it was not the
case—the condition interaction was not significant
(βr×Condition = 0.001, p = .917). vmPFC patients mini-
mized future disappointment (variable d in the model)
in their choices in private trials. This could reflect risk-
taking behavior typical in such patients (the disappoint-
ment variable of our model is similar to risk as measured
in economics and finance, i.e., variance of the potential
outcomes).
Lesion control patients did not maximize expected
values (βEV = 0.009, p = .743), showing reduced perfor-
mance in the choice task, but they did anticipate regret
(βr = 0.038, p < .001). When compared with the healthy
control group, they relied on expected values to make
their choice significantly less than the healthy control
group (βEV×Group = 0.123, p < .001), but they did not
differ in regret (βr×Group = 0.003, p = .698).
Choice Adaptation
We next tested the hypothesis that the social context fa-
cilitated regret anticipation in vmPFC patients during the
course of the task. We found a significant time trend (ran-
dom effect logistic regression βr×Trial = 0.0003, z = 2.14,
p < .032), where vmPFC patient anticipated regret in-
creasingly during the course of the task (Figure 5A).
When dividing complete feedback trials into three equal
parts, we found that regret anticipation was not signifi-
cant in vmPFC patients during early and middle trials
(Trials 1–26, βr = 0.008, p = .444; Trials 27–53, βr =
0.016, p = .119) and significantly lower than in the two
other groups (Trials 1–26, βr×Group = −0.038, p = .003;
Trials 27–53, βr×Group = −0.024, p = .046). During late
trials, however, vmPFC patients significantly anticipated
regret (Trials 54–80, βr = 0.028, p = .037) and the group
interaction was no longer significant (Trials 54–80,
βr×Group = −0.010, p = .524).
We next tested whether this increase of regret anticipa-
tion was driven by social trials. We ran a regression look-
ing at the effect of the condition of the preceding trial on
regret anticipation. There was a trend for vmPFC patients
to anticipate regret more, in their choices, when they
have experienced a social trial rather than a private trial
before (Figure 5B and Table 8). vmPFC patients signifi-
cantly minimized future regret in their decisions follow-
ing a social trial, but not after a private trial.
VLSM Analyses of Choice
We conducted two VLSM analyses on choice data. We
used the coefficients of anticipated regret (r coefficients
in all complete feedback trials) as the behavioral mea-
sures in the first and second VLSM analyses. To test the
hypothesis that OFC and dmPFC lesions might result in
different effects on regret anticipation in social and pri-
vate trials, we also tested them separately.
No voxel survived correction for multiple comparisons
for either analysis. Uncorrected analyses revealed that
Figure 5. Regret anticipation
during choices. (A) Evolution of
regret anticipation during the
course of the task for the three
groups. Logistic regressions
were run separately for early
Trials 1–26, middle Trials 27–53,
and late Trials 54–80. vmPFC
patients increasingly anticipated
regret over time. In early and
middle trials, their regret
coefficients were not
significantly different from zero
and were significantly lower
than the other two groups. By
the end of the task, they
significantly anticipated regret
in their choices in a way that was
statistically undistinguishable
from the other two groups. (B)
Regret anticipation for vmPFC
patients following private and
social trials. vmPFC patients
minimized future regret in
their choices after having
experienced a social trial
but not after a private trial.
Full regressions are shown
in Table 8.
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lesions in the medial orbitalfrontal cortex (MNI coordi-
nate 5, 45, −20; Z = −2.29) were associated with re-
duced anticipation of regret (r coefficients) in all trials.
Restricting the analysis to private trials yielded to the
same results (MNI coordinate 6, 44, −19; Z = −2.48).
No voxel was associated with a deficit in regret anticipa-
tion in social trials.
DISCUSSION
We studied the involvement of the ventromedial PFC in
decisions taken in private versus social settings. We con-
sidered two aspects of the decision process: (1) the effect
of private versus social counterfactual comparison on the
subjective evaluation of a decision outcome and (2) the
impact of private and social counterfactual information
on future decisions. In private settings, we confirmed
the existence of an impairment in patients with lesions
in the vmPFC in feeling regret after a suboptimal deci-
sion, as they did not show typical emotional reactions
to upward counterfactual comparison. In social settings,
by contrast, patients with vmPFC lesion provided normal
subjective ratings when confronted with the outcome
received by another person. More specifically, their re-
ported levels of envy were similar to controls, showing
a strong emotional amplification induced by social com-
parison. This suggests that the vmPFC does not critically
mediate the effect of social comparison on outcome eval-
uation. When considering choice behavior, we observed
that vmPFC patients avoided future regret less than con-
trol participants. During the course of the task, however,
they increased their anticipation of regret. In particular,
although they did not display clearly distinct choice be-
haviors in the private and social conditions, they inte-
grated their experience in private and social trials into
future choices differently. Even if they did not attempt
to avoid regret in choices following private trials, they
did use counterfactual information in their decisions in
choices following social trials, suggesting that the in-
crease of regret anticipation over time might be driven
by social comparison.
After correcting for multiple comparisons, VLSM analy-
ses did not reveal any significant lesion pattern associated
with regret deficit. Uncorrected analyses suggested that
failure to reason counterfactually during choices might
be associated with lesions in the mOFC.
The findings that vmPFC patients are not sensitive to
regret signals in private settings confirm the results of a
previous study (Camille et al., 2004) on a different cohort
of vmPFC patients. Unlike healthy and lesion controls, in
private settings, vmPFC patients did not take into ac-
count the outcome of the nonchosen lottery when eval-
uating their outcome, nor did they anticipate potential
negative consequences of their choices. Notably, our
vmPFC patients have lesions that spare lateral portions
of the PFC, and the results of the VLSM analyses con-
firmed the implication of the medial OFC in the experi-
ence and anticipation of regret. Thus, contrary to Levens
et al. (2014), we found impairment in regret processing
associated with a damaged medial OFC. However, our
sample of patients with specific lateral OFC lesions is
too small to exclude the possibility that lateral OFC le-
sions would result in a similar impairment. The regret
impairment is consistent with recent evidence of an
Table 8. Effect of the Condition of the Previous Trial on vmPFC Patients’ Choices
All Complete Trials Previous Trial = Private Previous Trial = Social
Choice Coeff SE z p Coeff SE z p Coeff SE z p
dEV 0.076 0.025 3.08 .002 0.044 0.033 1.33 .184 0.114 0.039 2.92 .003
d −0.042 0.011 −3.92 <.001 −0.032 0.014 −2.33 .02 −0.059 0.018 −3.23 .001
r 0.004 0.008 0.42 .671 0.006 0.009 0.68 .497 0.021 0.009 2.41 .016
r × Previous social 0.019 0.010 1.9 .057
Constant 0.021 0.075 0.28 .781 0.102 0.106 0.96 .335 −0.043 0.110 −0.39 .695
LL = −495.30 LL = −254.18 LL = −239.59
Wald χ2 = 42.35*** Wald χ2 = 14.91** Wald χ2 = 26.73***
Mixed logistic regression modeling the effect of the difference in expected value (dEV), anticipated disappointment (d ), anticipated regret (r), and its
interaction with the condition, private or social, of the preceding trial. Effects of particular interest are in bold. All complete feedback trials were
included in the left regression, the middle and right regressions report the effect of dEV, d, and r separately for trials that were preceded by a private
or social trial. There was a trend for vmPFC patient to take into account anticipated regret in their choice more after having just experienced a social
trial rather than a private trial. Anticipated regret was not significant when the previous trial was private, but it was significant for decisions following a
social trial, irrespective of the condition of the current trial.
**p < .01.
***p < .001.
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inability to imagine fictitious and future events following
vmPFC damage (Bertossi, Aleo, Braghittoni, & Ciaramelli,
2016). Indeed, the feeling of regret requires considering
an alternative reality in which a greater outcome is ob-
tained by making a different choice.
This study revealed, for the first time, that vmPFC pa-
tients are unimpaired when confronting the result of
their choices compared with those of others, showing
normal emotional responses to social comparison.
Similarly to healthy and lesion controls, vmPFC patients
reported feeling worse after a loss when informed of a
counterpart’s gain than after a loss without that informa-
tion. They also evaluated their outcomes more positively
when winning more than their counterparts, compared
with when they were winning alone. Thus, vmPFC pa-
tients’ subjective ratings are consistent with envy and
gloating, despite their impairment in recognizing these
emotions (Shamay-Tsoory, Tibi-Elhanany, & Aharon-
Peretz, 2007).
One possible explanation for the vmPFC patients’ lack
of impairment in the social comparison condition during
outcome evaluation concerns the visual salience in the
task of the lottery chosen by the other participant, which
was surrounded by a bright yellow square. Yet if the im-
pairment in the private condition had been due to a lack
of attention to the counterfactual information, vmPFC pa-
tients would have been impaired for positive counter-
factuals as well. Indeed, they would not have been able
to report relief if they had not processed the outcome
of the unchosen lottery first as healthy participants do
(Bault, Wydoodt, & Coricelli, 2016). Nonetheless, their
deficit is specific to negative counterfactuals, because
they did report subjective experiences similar to controls
for positive events. In addition, they distinguished be-
tween the private condition and situations in which the
other player chose the same lottery, suggesting that the
information on the other’s outcome is meaningful for
evaluating their own outcome. Thus, we can conclude that,
if the social information is more salient, it must derive from
its motivational relevance rather than from perceptual
aspects. A previous study with five prefrontal patients re-
ported higher skin conductance responses to emotionally
charged pictures during an active task, compared with
passive viewing (Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1990).
Although all conditions of our task were identically “active,”
it is possible that the social condition was more engaging
for patients, resulting in normal emotional responses.
Notably, the computational operation of comparing
an obtained outcome with an alternative outcome is
the same in both the private and the social condition.
The only difference in the social condition concerns the
knowledge that the alternative outcome belongs to
somebody else. The dissociation we observed in vmPFC
patients between private and social counterfactual pro-
cessing suggests that different brain networks are in-
volved in integrating these two types of information in
the valuation process.
Our previous fMRI findings (Bault et al., 2011) showed
that the mOFC encoded the difference between obtained
and foregone outcome the same regardless of the condi-
tion (private or social). By contrast, the dmPFC (frontal
polar cortex and ACC), the dorsolateral PFC, and the
TPJ responded more to social counterfactuals than to pri-
vate ones. In addition, the dmPFC was more activated
during decisions in social contexts than in private con-
texts. The dissociation we observed in vmPFC patients
between private and social counterfactuals is thus con-
sistent with our fMRI results: (1) the mOFC seems critical
for encoding and employing regret signals in guiding
decisions and (2) by contrast, integrating social com-
parison signals into the representation of an outcome
value might be supported by a more distributed network,
as all of our vmPFC patients were sensitive to social
comparison.
The normal emotional responses expressed by vmPFC
patients during social comparison events might be re-
lated to the specificity of our social condition, which
participants perceive as competitive. The social impair-
ment typically observed in this patient group might be
specific to altruistic choices, whereas competitive situa-
tions are spared (Krajbich, Adolphs, Tranel, Denburg, &
Camerer, 2009). Nevertheless, a recent study that in-
cluded a high number of patients with brain lesion attrib-
uted changes in altruistic donation and punishment to
the dmPFC, whereas the vmPFC did not bear a robust
relationship to social decisions (Moll et al., 2018).
Although social comparison strongly affected how
vmPFC patients evaluated the outcomes of their choices,
it was less clear how this effect translated into choice be-
havior. vmPFC patients did not anticipate future regret as
much as control participants—especially during early
trials—but there was no distinction between private
and social trials. Failure to anticipate regret in vmPFC
patients is consistent with the proposed role of the
vmPFC in generating a mental representation of the
choice problem—specifically, integrating the elements
relevant to the decision and incorporating information
about the potential future consequences of available
actions (McCormick, Ciaramelli, De Luca, & Maguire,
2018).
Interestingly, vmPFC patients progressively avoided
regret in their decisions during the course of the task. Such
learning effect was not previously reported and could be
driven by the social condition, with a spillover effect on
private trials. When looking at trial-by-trial effects on fu-
ture regret avoidance, we observed that vmPFC patients
were influenced by past counterfactual information from
social trials only, not from private trials. It suggests that
emotions elicited by social comparison, such as envy
and gloating, are able to drive behavior where private re-
grets fails as a teaching signal in vmPFC patients. It is also
possible that vmPFC patients were able to learn from im-
itating the choice behavior of their counterparts. Our de-
sign does not allow us to disentangle between these two
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possibilities; future research could employ a learning par-
adigm to investigate this question.
Finally, we were not able to confirm our hypothesis
concerning a potential dissociation between ventral and
dorsal portions of the medial PFC in their involvement in
private and social decisions. Although preliminary evi-
dence associated deficits in anticipating future regret in
private settings, no brain regions were associated with
deficit in social settings. A larger number of patients with
distinct focal vmPFC and dmPFC patients would be
needed to conclude on the precise role of these regions
in integrating social counterfactual value signals into de-
cisions. In addition, multivariate analyses might be more
appropriate to uncover a dissociation between two adja-
cent brain areas (Mirman et al., 2018; Mah, Husain, Rees,
& Nachev, 2014).
To conclude, our findings suggest that patients with le-
sions tightly restricted to the vmPFC are unable to reason
counterfactually and to anticipate the negative conse-
quences of their choices, while they preserve the ability
to experience emotional reactions elicited by social com-
parison. vmPFC patients were able to learn to anticipate
regret over the course of the task, an effect that seems to
be driven by their experience in social trials. We suggest
that vmPFC patients’ deficit in valuation and decision-
making cannot be attributed to a specific deficit in the
processing of social information. The abnormal social be-
havior that is typically found in this patient group should
be attributed to a general decision-making impairment
rather than to a failure to take into account other people
in evaluating the outcomes of their choices. It remains
unclear how their ability to process social comparison
signals transfers to future choices. Further work will be
needed to confirm that social comparison may serve as
a learning signal in patients with lesions in the vmPFC,
as it may have great potential for rehabilitation
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